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The consumption value of higher education is an important factor behind the individual’s 
educational choice. We provide a comprehensive literature survey, and define the 
consumption value as the private, intended, non-pecuniary return to higher education. We 
provide new empirical evidence for the willingness to pay for the consumption value of a 
particular type of higher education. Even when controlling for ability selection, we find on US 
data that Liberal Arts graduates were willing to forego 46 pct. of their potential income in 
order to enjoy the consumption value of this educational type. 
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1. Introduction 
What motivates an individual’s choice of higher education? The outcome of this decision has 
on aggregate level great implications for the society, as the educational choice of today’s 
young generation determines the skill composition of the future labor force. The established 
view is to consider higher education as a financial investment that generates a pecuniary 
return in the future.
4
However, the observed patterns in higher education do not support this view of the 
financial return being the main motivation for the choice of higher education. If this was the 
case, demand for higher education should be higher in countries with higher returns, ceteris 
paribus. But we observe high educational levels in countries with low wage returns, as clearly 
seen in figure 1.  
  For example,  the OECD recently stated that “Economic returns to 
education are a key driver for individuals’ decisions to invest time and money in education 
beyond compulsory schooling.” (OECD 2009, p. 154). 
 
Figure 1:   Enrolment into tertiary education and financial return (2005) 
 
 
Other institutional settings  might explain why there is no relationship between 
financial return to education and demand for education, such as admission barriers. But this 
does not  explain  the  very  low tax-graduation elasticity found by  Oliveira Martins et al. 
(2007): a five percentage point reduction in the marginal tax rate would only increase the 
                                                 
4 Prior to the human capital revolution in the 1960ies, education was considered to be a cultural good. One shortcoming of 
this framework was that it ignored the fact that pursuing education actually increases the productivity of the individual and 
his wages in the next period. Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964) introduced the theory of human capital, where education is an 
investment that increases the individual’s wage in the next period. During the 1970ies much attention was given to the 












































































Source: OECD Education at a 
glance 2009 and 2007. All 
countries for which data is 
available, are included. 
Note: Share of students 
measured by number of students 
enrolled in education related to 
population size for the age 
group 20-29. 3 
 
graduation ratio by 0.3 pct. on average.
5
The present paper is to our knowledge the first to give a comprehensive overview of the 
literature on non-pecuniary return to higher education. In the next section we classify different 
returns to education, both benefits and costs, and we define the consumption value of higher 
education as the private, intended, non-pecuniary  return  to education.  In section 3  we 
summarize existing empirical evidence on the existence of a consumption motivation behind 
the educational choice, both regarding educational level and type.  We also provide new 
evidence on a substantial willingness to pay for the consumption value of particular types of 
higher education,  based  on US data. When controlling for ability selection, we find that 
Liberal Arts graduates were willing to forego 46 pct. of their potential income in order to 
enjoy the consumption value of this educational type. This strong emphasis on  the 
consumption value of education as a motivation for the choice of educational type in a 
country like the US, with high wage differentials and a small social security system implies 
that the consumption value might be the dominant factor behind the choice of higher 
education in countries with low wage differentials and generous social security systems. We 
discuss this in more detail in section 4.   
 This should be considerably higher if education was 
a pure financial investment.  We do not argue that the financial return is not an important 
factor for the educational decision, but we argue that it is not the sole decisive factor. As 
Stoikov (1977) notes, conventional treatment of individual’s incentive to invest in education 
has a tendency to forget that education also is a consumption good. The consumption motive 
for the educational choice can be integrated in the investment view by allowing the 
educational investment to generate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. And lately, 
there is increasing interest in the consumption motive for the educational choice, as we show 
in section 2.  
2. Returns to higher education 
The individual’s choice of whether to invest in education is a result of an outweighing of the 
negative (costs) and positive (benefits) returns.  These returns may be both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary  and may occur both during and after attending higher education. The 
individual’s preferences determine how these factors are valued. Figure 2 gives a systematic 
overview of these different aspects of the return to higher education, which are discussed in 
detail in the following section.  
                                                 
5 The graduation rate is defined as the number of graduates in tertiary education compared to the potential 
graduates. 4 
 
Figure 2:   The private and social returns to higher education.  
 
2.1 Private pecuniary returns to higher education 
By acquiring higher education the individual increases his future wage when entering the 
labor force; this comes from two channels: (1) according to the human capital view of 
education, this is because higher education increases the skill level of the individual and raises 
his productivity in the labor force, which correspondingly leads to a higher wage (Becker, 
1964).  (2) According to the signaling view, in a labor market with asymmetric information 
higher education acts as a signal to employers of high ability, which makes it easier for the 
individual to acquire a high paid job (Spence, 1974). There has been a vast amount of 
research on the effect of educational length on earnings. The return to an additional year of 
schooling is typically found to be between 6 and 12 pct; lower for egalitarian countries such 
as Scandinavian countries and higher in UK, Ireland and US (see Card, 2001 and Trostel, 
Walker and Woolley, 2002).    
  In addition to the direct monetary return to education there is some indication that 
individuals with higher education enjoy more job related fringe benefits such as health 
insurance, pensions and subsidized food on the workplace, which can be seen as substitutes to 
a wage increase (Duncan, 1976).
6
  As stated by Bishop (1994), higher education can reduce the risk for unemployment. 
This may be by increasing flexibility in the job market, due to a high general knowledge level 
   
                                                 
6 Duncan (1976) defines fringe benefits as non-pecuniary. We classify fringe benefits as pecuniary returns to 
higher education, as they are part of the employer’s compensation for the employee’s work effort. This 
compensation could easily be replaced by increased wage. 
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and an improved ability to acquire new knowledge. In addition, higher education increases 
cross-country mobility (Schwartz, 1976). The educational process can also provide the 
individual with networks that can increase possibilities for future employment and earnings. 
The return to higher education depends on type of education, as well as on level. As 
shown by Walker and Zhu  (2003) and Arcidiacono (2004),  the wage return to higher 
education differs substantially across different college majors. Different educational types 
generate varying future income risks, measured by the variance of wage return (Christiansen 
et al., 2007).  The expected future monetary return is likely to depend on the current wage of 
individuals with that same educational type. Cunha and Heckman (2007) estimate ex ante and 
ex post earnings distributions of college graduates and determine the fraction that is due to 
heterogeneity and the fraction that is due to uncertainty. Alstadsæter (2009) shows that there 
can be substantial differences between expected (ex ante) and actual (ex post) relative wage 
return to an educational type. 
  Finally, there are pecuniary costs of higher education.  The direct costs, such as tuition 
fees, expenses for books and other study material are observed, while foregone labor income 
during the educational process is counterfactual and has to be estimated.  
2.2 Private, non-pecuniary returns to education 
The individual’s preferences are  not  necessarily  constant over  his  lifetime. They are 
influenced and shaped by the surroundings. New information, learning, experience, 
innovation and human interactions affect the individual and might induce a shift in 
preferences over time. The educational process might thus change the individual’s preferences 
such that the individual’s ex post preferences differ from the ex ante preferences. For example 
going to the opera might not have been enjoyable before the education, but after receiving 
higher education it might. These changes in preferences are ex ante unforeseen. They do not 
serve as a motivation behind the individual’s educational choice, and should thus not be 
included in the ex ante consumption value of education, even though they are non-pecuniary 
returns to the education. We thus distinguish between intended and unintended non-pecuniary 
returns to higher education. 
 
Intended non-pecuniary benefits 
Higher education can generate substantial non-pecuniary returns to the individual, both during 
the educational process, and after its completion. These can serve as a motive for the 6 
 
individuals’ educational choice, and different individuals will value these factors differently, 
depending on their preferences.  
   For many students the joy of learning serves as an important non-pecuniary return to 
higher education. This we can define as intrinsic motivation, when indiviuals do things just 
because they enjoy doing them, as discussed by Frey (1997). The intrinsic motivation to know 
is widely discussed within the psychology literature, see for instance Vallerand et al. (1992). 
In addition to the joy of learning new things, life as a student involves a range of activities 
that can give direct utility to the individual. These activities involve participating in sport 
events, parties, dating, meeting new people, moving to a new city or country, and 
experiencing campus life and participating in student activities (Nerdrum, 1999, Alstadsæter 
2009). Being a student in some sense also postpones adulthood, which may increase total 
utility dependent on the individual’s preferences (Ohles, 1968). 
During the educational process the individual can acquire a broad network, both 
locally and globally, that can provide direct utility through friendships, marriage, and wider 
horizons, both during the educational process and after.
7
Higher education also generates a certain consumption value after its completion, 
through status (Dolton et al. 1989), possibilities for interesting and challenging jobs 
(Weisbrod, 1962), and through performing what the individual considers important social 
tasks (Barnabou and Tirole, 2003). 
  This can be defined as cultural 
capital (Bordieu, 1973). Especially for some types of higher education there is an increase in 
social status from acquiring the education, which some individuals value highly and 
internalize  as part of their identity (Dolton et al., 1989, Akerlof and Kranton, 2003, and 
Bishop 2006).  In the previous section we discussed how higher education would reduce the 
future income risk. If the individual is risk averse, this reduced risk would in itself provide 
utility (Christiansen et al., 2007). 
After its completion, higher education provides the individual with utility through the 
possibility of getting an interesting and challenging job with good working conditions 
(Duncan, 1976). This increases job-satisfaction and overall well-being (Gardner and Oswald, 
2002).  Job-satisfaction and happiness as non-pecuniary return to education and especially 
work has received increasing attention lately (see for example Bjørnskov (2003), Benz (2005) 
and Kenny (2006)). Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) state that people with higher education 
report higher happiness. 
                                                 
7 Furthermore, networks can give the individual access to jobs and increase possibilities of employment and 
earnings, as we discussed in the previous section. 7 
 
Unintended non-pecuniary benefits 
The change in preferences that follows from being exposed to new environments, culture, 
individuals, knowledge results in other types of non-pecuniary returns, which are unforeseen 
by the individual at the time of the educational choice. Such unforeseen returns are increase 
productivity in household production and lead to more efficient household consumption 
(Michael 1972, Heckman, 1976, Vila, 2000). 
The change in preferences during the educational process induces the individual to 
change lifestyle. This results in several positive effects, such as improved health, better family 
planning, and marriage stability, which we will discuss in more detail in the following section 
on social returns to higher education.  These returns are by-products of the educational 
process and did not serve as a motive for the individual at the time of the educational choice.  
 
Non-pecuniary costs 
There are also non-pecuniary costs of higher education, and as the returns, they are individual 
specific. Here we do not distinguish between intended and unintended non-pecuniary costs.  
The educational process requires effort by the student, and these effort costs are often 
assumed to depend negatively on an individual's ability (Alstadsæter, Kolm and Larsen, 
2008). There can also be substantial stress and insecurity in the educational process, in 
relation to deadlines and exams. 
  As we have discussed earlier, the educational process might change the individual’s 
preferences. This, in combination with new networks, can lead to a kind of alienation from the 
individual’s home community and family. In addition, higher education may lead to some 
kind of forced urbanization as the individual might have to live in urban areas in order to get a 
job where he can apply the skills he acquired during the educational process. 
  Higher education increases the range of potential future jobs available to the 
individual, and also leads to an expectation of higher future wage. But as argued by Ferrante 
(2009), the individuals’ socio-economic aspirations will be upward biased when based on the 
statistical distribution of earnings, which typically is right skewed, as individuals tend to 
overrate their own abilities. This can then lead to ex post frustration from unfulfilled 
expectations regarding the individual’s actual return to the educational process. 
2.3   Social return to higher education 
There is a rich literature on both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary social returns of education.   8 
 
Education and health is often found to be positively related (Becker, 1993, Lleras-Muney, 
2005, Grossman, 2005). In particular there seems to be a negative effect from education on 
drinking (Sander, 1999) and smoking (Miranda and Bratti, 2009). A higher educational level 
is often related to better family planning (Angrist and Lavy, 1996).  Furthermore  higher 
education is found to be related to less crime, and a common result is that education has a 
causal negative effect on incarceration, as shown by Lochner and Moretti (2004).  There is 
also a general perception that higher education fosters good citizens, measured in charitable 
work, political participation, and voting, as demonstrated by Milligan, Moretti and 
Oreopoulos (2004) and Perna (2000).  
While these factors are both pecuniary (better health and more safety involves less 
costs for the government) and non-pecuniary (better well being),  Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) 
and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) found that education also has a more direct pecuniary 
effect by promoting technological change and enhancing economic growth.  
There are also social costs of higher education. The educational sector occupies a large 
share of resources in the societies. In the OECD tertiary education alone constitutes 1.9 pct. 
(OECD, 2009) of combined GDP. Especially in countries with public provision of higher 
education at low or no direct costs for the students this means an increased tax level and a 
crowding out of the provision of other public services. This in turn implies redistribution from 
tax payers to the students. An additional social cost is the withdrawal for students from the 
labor force for the duration of the education, as emphasized by Bowles (1967). 
 
2.4   Definition: Consumption Value of Higher Education 
Based on the discussion above, we will now define the consumption value of higher 
education. These are  the non-pecuniary return that the individual is willing to pay for, 
measured in foregone future labor income, at the time of the educational choice. This means 
that we exclude unintended returns that follow from changed preferences during the 
educational process. We also exclude social returns, as it is unlikely for students to have 
private willingness to pay for future aggregate crime reduction and growth effects when 
making his educational choice. The consumption value of a particular type of education can 
be both positive and negative, depending on the individual’s preferences. If the benefits 
dominate the costs, higher education is a consumption good; vice versa it is a consumption 
bad.  By only concentrating higher education, we rule out compulsory schooling, in which 
investment is determined by schooling laws and not by individual choice. We now define the 
consumption value of higher education:  9 
 
Definition 1: 
The consumption value of higher education    ≡   the private, intended, non-pecuniary 
returns to higher education 
 
These are the non-pecuniary returns that the individual is willing to pay for at the time of the 
educational choice, by forgoing the financial return they could have achieved by choosing an 
educational type that generates a higher future wage return.   
3. Empirical evidence of a consumption value 
 
Higher education generates pecuniary return after its completion, but non-pecuniary return 
both during the education and after its completion. We can make a theoretical distinction 
between during and after returns, but when estimating the individual’s willingness to pay for 
the consumption value of education, this distinction is not possible. It is not straightforward 
how a consumption value of higher education can be measured. To get an idea of the strengths 
and weaknesses of different approaches we briefly review the scarce empirical literature on 
this issue. Then we present new evidence on the existence of a considerable willingness to 
pay for the consumption value of particular types of higher education amongst US college 
graduates. 
3.1 The empirical literature on the consumption value of education 
Lazear (1977) assumes that all individuals maximize utility when choosing the optimal 
educational length. If the utility maximizing level is longer than the wealth maximizing level, 
education itself must be a good. His results show that for up to 17 years of schooling 
education is a bad, where after it is a good.
8
Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) test different theoretical models of motivation for 
higher education enrolment on Dutch data. They test the models empirically in two years and 
find that a pure financial model is rejected in one year, while an integrated model of education 
as investment and consumption based on Kodde and Ritzen (1984) is accepted in both years. 
Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2000) use a Dutch survey to estimate a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function and find a positive schooling preference. 
 
Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) estimate the counterfactual earnings (a 
treatment effect) of college education. They include non-pecuniary returns to education in the 
                                                 
8 Another approach was taken by Gulasson (1989), who uses the U.S. army draft to provide a measure of “one” aspect of the 
consumption value of higher education, namely the possibility for avoiding the draft while in college. He measures to what extend the 
demand for education increases, when the likelihood of being drafted increases. In our opinion the finding of Gulasson is not useful in 
general. It only shows how much schooling is worth in respect to avoid drafting. 10 
 
individuals’ utility function and find that there is a consumption component, even after 
controlling for uncertainty. It should be emphasized, that finding a consumption value is not 
the main objective of their study, but is a sub result of their analysis. 
Another approach, taken by Christiansen et al. (2007), is to study the risk-return trade-
off of different types of educational types. They identify which educational types are efficient 
investment assets, in the sense that the income risk is compensated by a higher wage return, 
and which educational types are inefficient investment assets and thus seem to be chosen out 
of consumption motives. 
All the above mentioned papers have only considered higher education as a 
homogenous good. When trying to document the existence of consumption value of education 
and estimating the willingness to for it in different types of higher education, the problem of 
ability  sorting arises. In principle, one could compare the wage return to two different 
educational types in a compensating differentials framework and conclude that the type with 
the lower wage return has the higher consumption value.  But individuals have different 
innate ability, and wage differentials across different educational types could merely reflects 
that high-ability individuals sort into the educational types generating the higher wage return. 
In a dynamic setting of college choice Arcidiacono (2004) finds that ability sorting 
cannot explain the variation in wage premiums across different types of majors amongst 
college graduates. He concludes that sorting is  due to differences in preference and not 
because of a difference in ability. 
While  controlling for ability, Alstadsæter (2009)  documents that high-ability 
individuals who attended Teachers’ College in Norway during the 1960's could have 
increased their life-time income substantially by choosing an alternative educational type. The 
ex post price for this consumption value of Teacher’s College turned out to be even higher 
than the estimated ex ante willingness to pay for it.   
3.2 New evidence based on US data 
One way to measure whether education has a consumption value is to compare the difference 
in lifetime earnings of actual and counterfactual educations as done by Alstadsæter (2004). 
The rational individual with perfect foresight will choose the educational type with the highest 
expected utility. If education is a pure financial investment, the utility maximizing educational 
type is the same as the wealth maximizing. If we observe that the agent chooses an 
educational type different from the wealth maximizing, education must have a consumption 
value. This is in line with the approach taken by Lazear (1977) on the individuals’ chosen 11 
 
levels of education. However, our econometric methodology is different to previous 
approaches and more in line with Berger (1988) who pursues a different question. 
Data and methodology 
We use the US representative sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79) with rich information on each individual. The initial dataset consists of 6,111 
individuals. We only consider college graduates who graduated before 1988. Our final dataset 
consists of 740 individuals. The individuals were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and 
every other year from then. We classify the various types of college majors into five types: 
Science (16 pct.), Liberal Arts (28 pct.), Business & Law (28 pct.), Education & Nursing (18 
pct.), and Engineering (8 pct.).
9
For each type of major we want to estimate an earnings function in order to be able to 
predict earnings. The idea of self-selection (Roy, 1951, Willis and Rosen, 1978) implies that 
individuals choose an education or occupation that suits them well. Even if a farmer were 
treated with the same education as the lawyer, he would probably not be as good a lawyer as 
the lawyer, and vice versa.  
 We use information on potential annual earnings, which we 
adjust to 2005-level using the consumer price index.  For estimation we use information on 
the individuals’ socio-economic background, individual characteristics, high school subjects, 
and eight ability measures, as displayed in table A.2.  A special feature of the data is that we 
can extract information on actual experience as number of weeks worked per year.  This 
implies that we can avoid the problems known from the Mincerian specification where 
experience typically is measured by age minus graduation year (Mincer 1974). In our setting 
we then avoid the problem of individuals leaving the labor force for periods, in which the 
Mincerian specification would overestimate their experience. A full list of variables used is 
presented in table A2 in the appendix. 
We control for selection by applying the methodology of polychotomous choice 
selection models introduced by Lee (1983). The intuition is to generate a variable that controls 
for selection. The theory of selection implies that the individuals self-select into educations or 
occupations for which they have a special talent. If we were able to observe this special talent, 
we could include directly this in our equation, but this is unfortunately not the case. We can 
however use the fact that the theory also implies, that an agent with a greater likelihood of 
choosing an education also will have a higher talent for this educational type, ceteris paribus. 
If we can predict how likely it is that an individual chooses a specific education, we can use 
                                                 
9 See table A1 in the appendix for a detailed description of the college major classification.  12 
 
this to control for selection. The greater the likelihood, the greater is the individual’s special 
talent. We therefore first predict the likelihood of choosing the different educational types. 
This likelihood should control for selection. Our estimation strategy is similar to Berger 
(1988) and we estimate the following earnings equation with OLS, for each college major 
type: 
      ,      (1) 
where yijt is the log of the annual earnings for individual i with the education j and 
actual experience t. These earnings depend on individual characteristics which we include in a 
vector Xi and experience t and the selection term   which is generated in a first step mixed 
logit estimation of the college choice: 
          ,          (2) 
where   is the standard normal density function.  
We can summarize our estimation procedure as: 
I.  We estimate   with a mixed logit model using data on individual characteristics, 
ability scores, financial information and high school subjects. Using the estimated    
we form .  
II.  Using   from the first stage and individual characteristics, a composite ability score 
as well as experience, we estimate equation (1) with OLS. 
Note that if     , then    must be positive, in other words    implies positive 
selection, so that individuals who are likely to choose education j receive higher earnings with 
this education, than if a random individual was treated with the same education. See the 
technical appendix for a more detailed description of the estimation procedure.  
  
Results 
Selected estimation coefficients from the OLS estimation of (1) are presented in table 1 
below. We have evidence for positive selection for both Science and Education & Nursing, 
which means that these graduates’ abilities correlate well with the required skills in these 
professions and that they have a higher wage return to education than if a random individual 
was to acquire these types of education. There is no evidence of selection in Engineering and 











Experience 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Experience sq −0.00*** −0.00*** −0.00*** −0.00*** −0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08)
White −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 −0.18*** 0.37**
(0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15)
Selection −0.25*** 0.23*** −0.06 −0.14** 0.04
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Children 0.05*** −0.11*** −0.06*** −0.04** −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 10.08*** 9.39*** 9.75*** 9.76*** 9.72***
(0.18) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.17)
Observations 1439 2681 2784 1814 809
Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: *,* ,* denotes significance on respectively a 10, 5 and 1 pct level.
 
 
Even after we have controlling for selection there are substantial differences in the wage 
returns to the different majors.  Using a representative individual
10
 
 we can predict the earning 
profiles using the estimated coefficients.  We see from figure 3 that the earning profiles differ 
substantially over educational type. Engineering graduates have the highest annual income for 
all levels of experience, while Liberal Arts graduates have the lowest. 
Figure 3:   Predicted earning profiles 
 
 
Predicting present values 
Recall that we use actual experience in estimating the returns to education. In order to be able 
to compare the returns, we predict earnings by using the same amount of experience for all 
individuals. Using actual experience provides us with coefficients on how the earnings depend 
on experience measured in years, which we use to predict earnings for up to 26 years of 
experience. The reason for why we only predict for 26 years is that we don’t have any 
observations with more than this amount of education and we want to avoid out of sample 
                                                 










































prediction. The choice of discount rate does not affect the relative return; we apply a rate of 4 
pct. in our calculations of present values.  
  For each college major type we calculate the average present value of the income from 
the first 26 years of work experience and compare this with the highest alternative income. 
The results are shown in table 2. It is seen that Liberal Arts and Education & Nursing 
graduates have the lowest present value and sacrifice 46 and 34 pct. of their potential income.  
 







Actual earnings 879.118 632.324 942.177 740.676 1.237.441,00
(207.546) (159.867) (211.569) (150.191) (144.857)
Highest potential earnings 1.180.683 1.177.440 1.184.821 1.137.466 1.245.325
180.481 186.767 192.105 182.935 142.293
Difference in earnings 301.745 545.116 242.644 396.790 7.885
(145.184) (130.783) (167.398) (187.831) (25.683)
Difference in earnings (pct.) 16 46 20 34 1
(12) (9) (13) (13) (2)
Fraction that maximized income 3 0 7 2 89
Standard deviations in parenthesis. Earnings are in 2005 USD.  
 
We conclude that Liberal Arts and Education & Nursing graduates sacrifice a substantial part 
of their lifetime earnings in order to attend their desired type education, even when we control 
for ability selection. The same is the case for Business School & Law and Science graduates. 
Following Alstadsæter (2009), we define these as educational types with high consumption 
value, as they attract high-skilled individuals even at a low wage return. These individuals 
could have chosen educations with higher wage returns, but instead chose to forego these 
potential wage returns in order to enjoy the consumption value of their preferred educational 
type.  
It is not possible to determine whether the consumption value on average varies over 
educational type. It is also possible that the consumption value varies as much over 
individuals as over type. An educational type might be a positive consumption good for one 
individual, while it is a bad for another individual. 
4.  Discussion  
The wage return to higher education cannot explain the observed educational patterns 
across countries. As we showed in figure 1 there seems to be no positive correlation between 
the wage premium to tertiary education and enrolment.  We argue that the consumption value 
of higher education is an important factor behind the individual’s educational choice. The 
willingness to pay for the consumption value of education can vary across individuals and 15 
 
countries, depending on individual preferences, pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to 
education, and future income uncertainty. We will now discuss this in more detail. 
Taxes reduce the price of education as a consumption good, measured in foregone 
labor income, but they also reduce the overall income level of the individual.
11
There is a negative correlation between the generosity of the social security system in 
a country and the degree of wage dispersion, as documented by Barth and Moene (2009). The 
Scandinavian countries have the most generous social security systems, twice as generous as 
the US, and they also have the most compressed wage systems. At the other extreme, the US 
has among the least generous social security systems in the study, but by far the greatest wage 
dispersion. In the same paper, Barth and Moene also document a clear negative correlation 
between a generous social security system and the wage return to higher education; the wage 
premium to tertiary education in the  Scandinavian  countries is 2-4 pct., while this wage 
premium in the US is around 8 pct. 
  The 
substitution effect induces the individual to consume more education and to shift into 
educational types with higher consumption value, as pointed out by Alstadsæter, Kolm, and 
Larsen (2008). It is more likely that this substitution effect dominates the income effect in 
countries with a generous social security system that provides a given minimum income for 
all citizens. If health services are more or less free, and the state also provides a generous 
disability, unemployment and old age benefit system, each individual’s income uncertainty by 
choosing an educational type that generates a low wage return is reduced. These countries 
often also provide higher education at no costs for the individual. We would thus expect 
students in egalitarian countries to put more emphasis on the consumption value of education 
when making their educational choice. 
  In most countries, Business School generates a high wage return compared to 
Humanities and Social Sciences, as documented by Arcidiacono (2004) on US data. As we 
see in figure 4 below, there is a negative relationship between the share of graduates in social 
science & humanities and income inequality in the OECD, measured by the after-tax gini 
coefficient. This seems to confirm our previous hypothesis, that individuals in egalitarian 
countries put more emphasis on the consumption value when making their educational choice. 
                                                 
11 Heckman (1976) is one of the first to theoretically recognize the importance of nonmarket benefits of education for tax policy. He 
concludes that a proportional tax rate distorts the decision between investment in physical and human capital. This distortion increases, when 
education has non-market benefits. Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) show tthat the Scandinavian dual income tax system (with a proportional 
tax on capital income and a progressive tax on labor income) is efficient regarding investments in financial vs. human capital. In their setting 
education has no consumption value, but Alstadsæter (2003) shows that these arguments are even stronger when education has a 
consumption value.  Judd (2001) shows that the optimal long run tax of human capital is non-zero if education has a consumption value. 
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) demonstrate that the optimal marginal tax rate is higher when education has a consumption value and Dur and 
Glazer (2008) show that means-tested student grants / tuition fees can be reasoned for efficiency reasons when education is also consumption 
good. 16 
 
Low wage differentials and high taxes reduce the price of the consumption value of the 
Humanities and Social Science educational type, measured in foregone labor income by not 
choosing Business School, which here represents the educational type generating the higher 
wage return. We already stated that countries with low wage differentials tend to have 
generous social security systems, and this further removes the risk of choosing educational 
type based on preferences rather than financial return. In case of illness or unemployment the 
basic needs will be met by the social security system. This does not mean, however, that 
business school has a low consumption value; it could well be that the individuals attending 
business school prefer this educational type, and in addition receives a high wage return.  
 
Figure 4:    Demand for different types of higher education in the OECD vs. inequality.  
 
    In section 3 of this paper, we document a substantial willingness to pay for the 
consumption value of a particular type of education even in the US. When controlling for 
ability selection, we find that Liberal Arts graduates were willing to forego 46 pct. of their 
potential income in order to enjoy the consumption value of this educational type. The great 
importance of the consumption  value of education  as a motivation for the choice of 
educational type in a country with high wage differentials and a small social security system 
implies that the consumption value might be the dominant factor behind the choice of higher 
education in countries with low wage differentials and generous social security systems.  
Nearly 2 pct. of the combined GDP in the OECD is spent on higher education, and the 
share of public provision varies across countries.
12
                                                 
12 OECD: Education at a Glance 2009. 
  Much of the rationale for a public 
provision of higher education has been to enhance growth, but the focus has been on the level 
of higher education, instead of its composition. By providing higher public education free of 
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enables a higher participation rate in higher education. But it also to some extent subsidizes 
private consumption of education. The individuals are not faced with the actual costs of the 
education, and might thus acquire too much education from a social point of view. A 
compressed wage structure in egalitarian societies also reduces the price of the consumption 
value of many educational types, measured in foregone wage income. This can contribute to a 
skill mismatch in the society, that individuals to a lesser extent acquire the types of educations 
that are desired from a social planner’s point of view. This implies redistribution from other 
groups in the society, as and much tax revenue is spent on financing the students’ direct 
consumption of education instead being spent on providing other types of public services. 
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Table A.1:   College major type classifications 
Major Category  Fields of Study
Science Architecture and Environmental Design, Biological Sciences, 
Computer and Information Sciences, Mathematics, Military 
Sciences, Physical Sciences
Liberal Arts  Area Studies, Communications, Fine and Applied Arts, 
Letters, Library Science, Psychology, Public Affairs and 
Services, Health Professions (not nursing), Home Economics, 
Social Sciences (not economics), Theology, Foreign Languages
Business School & Law Business and Management, Law, Economics
Education & Nursing  Education, Nursing
























 Variable Description Mixed Logit E arnings
afqt Afqt score. * *
asvab1 Relative score in asvab, general science (0-100). * *
asvab2 Relative score in asvab, arithmetic reasoning (0-100). * *
asvab3 Relative score in asvab, word knowledge (0-100). * *
asvab4 Relative score in asvab, paragraph comparison (0-100). * *
asvab5 Relative score in asvab, numerical operations (0-100). * *
asvab6 Relative score in asvab, coding speed (0-100). * *
asvab7 Relative score in asvab, auto and shop info (0-100).
asvab8 Relative score in asvab, mathematics knowledege (0-100). * *
asvab9 Relative score in asvab, electronics info (0-100).
birth The year of birth.
children The number of children, measured in year 2006. *
dadcollege Whether the father obtained a college degree, 1=college. *
dadhighdeg Whether the father obtained a degree higher than a college , 1=higher *
exp The mincerian experience, year since graduation.
expsq The square of exp.
femaleman Whether the head female was a manager when the individual was 14, 1=manager. *
femaleprof
          p         , 
1=professional. *
lnincome The log of potential yearly income. *
loan Whether the individual received any loans during college, 1=loan *
male The gender, 1=male. * *
maleman Whether the head male was a manager when the individual was 14, 1=manager. *
maleprof
          p         , 
1=professional. *
master Whether the individual received a master degree, 1=master. *
momcollege Whether the mother obtained a college degree, 1=college.
momhighdeg Whether the mother obtained a degree higher than a college degree, 1=higher.
higha Number of high school subjects related to arts. *
highb Number of high school subjects related to business. *
highl Number of high school subjects related to languages. *
highs Number of high school subjects related to science. *
public Whether the individual went to public school from grade 1-12, 1=public *
pv Present value of majors.  Calculated with an interest rate of 3 pct. *
siblings Number of siblings.
smsa Whether lived in SMSA, SMSA=1. * *
south Whether lived in the south, 1=south.  * *
tenure Weeks out of 52 worked in that calender year. *
tenuresq The square of tenure. *
urban Whether lived in urban area, 1=urban. * *
year The calendar year. * *
yeardeg The year of graduation.
* denotes whether the variable was included. Some variables were included indirectly.




Let the log of the annual earnings for individual i with the education j and experience t be yijt . These 
earnings depend on individual characteristics which we include in a vector Xi and experience t. The equation thus 
has the form: 
                (A1) 
where   is an error term.  Earnings are only observed for individuals who actually studied education j.  The 
concept of selection implies that OLS estimation of (A1) on this truncated sample will be inconsistent if the 
choice of major is correlated with the earnings from that major (Roy 1951). In other words, an individual could 
choose an educational type that he is more talented for and thus receive a higher financial return than if a random 
individual acquired this type of education. 
To handle the problem of selection we estimate earnings using a polychotomous choice selection model. 
We can separate the error term in (A1) into two components   where  is assumed to have zero 
expectation and   is the expected value of   given education j is chosen. This expectation can be shown to be 
, where   is the probability that individual i chooses education j, and   is the standard 
deviation of  ,   the correlation between the earnings and a the college choice.  The term:    
can be estimated with a mixed logit model. From the data we have information about the individuals’ high 
school subjects, their score in eight different ability tests, whether they had student loans and standard 
background variables such as sex, race and parents educational history. Furthermore we can calculate average 
earnings for each major type. We use this information to estimate    for all individuals with a maximum 
likelihood estimation of a mixed logit model. We can then rewrite equation (A1) to:  
    ,    (A2) 
which as shown by Lee (1983) can be estimated consistently with OLS.  
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